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INITIATIVES OF TV ETHICS CONTROL BY RELIGIONS IN RUSSIA:
CHALLENGES FOR IM PLEM ENTATION
By Victor M . Khroul
Victor M. Khroul is a native of Byelorussia. He received a Diploma of St. Thomas Aquinas
Catholic Theology College, Moscow, Russia (1995) and a Master’s degree (1986) in
Journalism and Ph.D. from Moscow State University, Russia (1993). He is currently a
Researcher at Moscow State University, Journalism Department (since September, 1995),
and a professor, Saint-Petersburg Catholic Seminary (since January, 1998), as well as an
expert, at the Russian Information Agency “Novosti”.
Introduction and Historical Background
The diversity of attitudes of Russian society towards television coupled with many plots
and subplots emerged in the public arena providing us with an opportunity to consider them as
an indicators of the maturity of civil society in Russia. It is also an indicator of the level of influence
that religions have in the public sphere and the content of TV programs. I will base my judgment
on public declarations by authorities of the idea that Russia strives to build a civil society, rather
than examining in details the discussion whether the existence of a civil society in Russia is a fact.
The current situation on Russian TV is a permanent source of concern for many people in Russia.
Heated public debate about the necessity of social control over Russian TV programs was raised
first by religious organizations and then supported by various groups of civil society. The current
public debate over the moral control of TV has its roots in perestroika, a time when freedom of
media was not accompanied by proper understanding of media responsibility in Russia.
In 1999 - this debate almost resulted in a legislative act , a federal law “On a Higher Council
for the Defense of M orality in Television and Radio Broadcasting in the Russian Federation.” This
law proposal passed through the State Duma [Parliament] and was approved by the Council of the
Federation. But President Boris Yeltsin vetoed the law proposal (M edia Law, 1999).
Contemporary “Paradoxes”: The Public Trusts TV But Asks for Censorship
On the one hand the situation with the TV seems to be good – people watch TV and trust it.
Representative survey of the urban population of Russia conducted by the M oscow Center for M ass
Communications Studies in December 2008 (2467 respondents were queried in 20 locations) shows
that television is the main source of information about current events – it was mentioned by 69.4
% of respondents. And the alienation of TV from the next source in the m edia hierarchy is very
significant – newspapers were trusted by only 26.5 %. The next was the Internet and radio with
almost equal number of respondents - 24.5% and 23.4% respectively (Razin, 2009). Russian
sociologists note that the leadership of television in the mass media hierarchy has tended to
increase.
According to the data of the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM ) on
December, 16 2008, Russian citizens most of all trust the central TV (70 % ), of which 44% most often
trust it and 26 % of respondents fully trust it. Inhabitants of middle, small towns and villages said
that they trust this information source even more often (72-74 %). Distrust of the Central television
is expressed by 25 % of Russians, though 17 % mostly do not trust it, while 8 % totally do not trust
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it. This estimate is most typical for inhabitants of Moscow and Saint Petersburg (35 %); 2 % do not
use this source for getting information. (VCIOM , 2008a)
VCIOM data published in December, 2008, show that 58 % of respondents suppose that
Russian media need state censorship, of which 26 % of them are sure that this is necessary. One fourth
(24 %) object to censorship (and just 8 % of them object strongly). Another fifth – or 18 % of
respondents – found it difficult to replying. (VCIOM , 2008)
As I see it, the phenomenon of “trust with demand for censorship” is a good subject for the
study for scholars researching TV audiences. However, deeper data analysis is necessary for
clarifying the situation whereas the majority of sociological research services and centers publish
the results of linear analysis of survey data. M ost do not conduct additional analysis taking into
consideration social and demographic characteristics of respondents, that are necessary to
understand more precisely who demands censorship, and what kind it is..
Public Council for M orality on TV: Development of the Initiative
The idea of establishing the Public Council on Morality on TV was proposed by the Club
of Orthodox Journalists in November 2007 and was supported by Patriarch Alexy II of M oscow and
All Russia. "The major part of society, politicians, pedagogues, artists, journalists say that no one
is happy with destructive amorality and thoughtless entertainment dominating on TV as it harms
everyone," Alexy II noted.
As can be seen from media interest in this topic and from the frequent mentioning of this
idea in the media the amount or the “temperature” of journalistic and public attention to this issue
did not decline, but remained at a constant level. The results of frequent analysis conducted using
full text database of INTEGRUM sources show that press, radio and TV demonstrate stable interest
in this subject. Diagram #1 illustrates the dynamics of mentions of the phrase “Public Council for
M orality” in the national and regional press, national and regional information agencies, TV and
radio broadcasting and online media in period of November 2007 – M arch 2009.
It is quite explainable that media interest increased when the chairman of the Council of
Federation, Sergey M ironov and Patriarch Alexey II of M oscow and All Russia declared the
necessity of establishing the Public Council (January, 2008) and during the discussions of proper
law proposal at the State Duma (December, 2008)
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Diagram #1. Level of Attention of Russian M edia Regarding the Public Council for M orality

It is curious that television and radio themselves expressed minimum attention and
demonstrated less interest to the possible establishment of the Council for M orality on TV (see table
1). This marginally proves their reluctance to accent the attention on the responsibility towards the
audience and to acknowledge themselves affected.
Table 1. Diverse M edia Attention to the Public Council for M orality
(from the time of plot appearance, November 2007 till February 2009). Database inquiry is “Public
Council for M orality” (936 documents).
Type of media
Central printed media
Central information agencies
Regional printed media
Regional information agencies
Online mass media
Tele- and radio broadcasting

Total number of mentions
102
139
122
21
518
34

The following sections present the sides of the current debate on the subject, including
supporters and opponents of social control.
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Voices “Pro”
One of the brightest leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin,
(who at the tim e of the survey was vice-chairman of the M oscow Patriarchate Department for
External Church Relations, but is currently the head of the Synodal Church and Society
Department), believes that “the Council must not forbid anything, but should formulate an opinion,
which will be brought to the viewers’ notice.”
Another position belongs to the Orthodox public circles. “The Council will not be involved
in any kind of censorship, especially preliminary one. The M oral Council should give its judgment
on the TV administration’s actions instead of censoring,” stated Alexander Schipkov, the chairman
of the Orthodox journalists club and councilor to the Chairman of the Council of Federation. He
also stressed that “Society has lost its control over TV channels, thus norms of public morality were
violated and it results in defilement of children.”
M edia also have their voice in these debates. President of the Orthodox media-holding
“Radonezh” Evgeny Nikiforov, stated that the Council should in no way limit creative freedom and
freedom of word, it only intended to oppose ‘freedom in business, freedom of greed’.
Leaders of Catholic, Protestant, Jewish and other religious communities and also NGO's
have supported the project. At the same time besides general complains about morality on TV any
one of the religious organizations has permanent monitoring of TV programs or movies from their
teaching view point. Religious leaders and journalists react "ad hoc" to the most controversial cases,
pitting their hopes that the new Council will be established.
The head of the M inistry for Culture of the Russian Federation, A lexander Avdeev,
described Russian TV products as “low-grade”, “immoral” and “harmful”. Saying this, minister
Avdeev at the same time recognized that TV and mass media in general needed additional
regulation from the Parliament and government.
The famous Russian TV journalist, Vladimir Pozner, said that during the recent
parliamentary and presidential election campaigns, “there were some absolutely banned things:
you cannot talk about this, you cannot show this, and you cannot invite that one.” Vladimir Pozner
warned about the danger of “black”, “behind the curtain” regulation. Transparency and control by
civil society systems seems to him to be more acceptable.
“Establishing a public council to supervise the federal TV channels' performance would
be a great thing to do; we have agreed on its composition and range of authority,” Glasnost Defense
Foundation president Alexei Simonov said. Alexei Simonov is a well-known fighter for freedom
of speech. But he also insists on the extreme necessity of journalists' responsibility for the contents
of mass media.
Internet public opinion survey conducted recently by web-portal Religare.ru shows, that
about 70 % of visitors are in favor of the Council for M orality on TV, 26 % are against it and 3.9 %
expressed no opinion. Let us look more attentively to the reasons and arguments of those who are
against the Council. (“Religion and M edia”, 2009).
Voices “Contra”
A controversial position is demonstrated by those professional, media public circles that
show little concern about the spiritual side of a problem. The National Association of TV and Radio
Broadcasters President Eduard Sagalayev stressed: “There is too little truth and too much vulgarity
on our television.” The information policy that has taken shape in Russia “in fact does not provide
for open debate and in fact does not provide for live broadcasts.” “I do not support the establishing
of a public council supervising morals either. In addition, the new council will require a lot of
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money. W e would do better to invest such money in producing of program s for children,”
Sagalayev said. He does not see the Council as an efficient step in order to reduce vulgarity on
Russian television.
The Chairman of the Public Chamber's M edia and Freedom of Speech Commission, Pavel
Gusev, said that the media law had no clauses pertaining to the activity of publishers and media
owners. “Not only authorities but also owners put pressure on the media, and we must do
something about that,” he said. “I do not believe that any council can change something in our
society and the media,” said Gusev, who is head of a big media holding company himself. Pavel
Gusev is the Editor-in-Chief of the biggest daily newspaper in M oscow, so his position is of more
weight in public opinion in comparison to those who are in power.
Even if the council is made up of authoritative and unbiased people, they will be unable
to cope with the large amount of television programs in modern Russia, said television journalist
and head of the Public Chamber's Nationality Affairs Commission, Nikolai Svanidze. “There is not
only a ‘technical’ reason: if it is impossible to monitor all TV content - there will be selection, and
if there is selection - it could be easily used as a tool of pressure,” stressed the journalist. M oreover
up to this moment it is not known whether this advisory and supervising (in its concept) Council
turns into the Ministry of the Truth from G. Orwell’s “1984” having punitive rights? Journalists of
the elder generation in Russia remember well such type of Soviet institution making merciless and
categorical censorship as Glavlit.
The main theme of voices “contra” is a “phobia” of the renewal or rebirth of strong
ideological controls on media, which has been dominant in the USSR. Those opponents who have
invested into “immoral” business on TV very often claim that any attempt at regulation of media
is an offensive step against the freedom of speech. They hide their interest and profit behind the
slogan of "Glasnost needs to be defended." At the same time "Glasnost Defense Foundation” president
Alexei Simonov is in favor of new Council for M orality on TV.
The discussion still continues. Russian Federation Council head, Sergey M ironov,
confirmed that a public council may soon be established to supervise the content of programs on
Russian television. He said he had already submitted an appropriate draft law to the State Duma
for approval. After the public council initiative was supported by President Dmitry M edvedev at
his meeting with Duma fraction leaders, it is likely to be approved by parliament without delay.
Another step in that direction might be a ban on the show of commercials on public TV channels
as it was done in France. The impact of a new Public Council may lead to substantial changes, from
the review of policy concepts on federal TV channels to the replacement of their head managers.
Fundamental Challenges
The case for Public Council for M orality could be considered as the diagnostics of the
relations between mass media and civil society in Russia. Evolution of civic attention toward
Russian TV means that its accents are moving from the opportunity of participation in agenda
setting processes or at least influencing this agenda setting and the media contents to the necessity
of control. Systematic neglect of citizens as active subjects of information process, the imitation of
their participation in TV activity (maximally as a crowd scene at talk-shows), arrogant reluctance
to work with the audience have led to the situation that the most active citizens and public
institutions expressed the will to control thing when they cannot participate in them. And if some
time ago there was no threat for the monopoly and TV channels' owners and producers nowadays
the idea of new institution that could obtain not only moral but real power attract the support and
voices of highly influential politicians who would like to participate in media management.
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W ithin the frames of the public debates regarding the Public Council for M orality idea, the
major part of objections refer to the practical aspects of such a Council while the main obstacles
significantly complicating the essence and sense of future activity of the Council are not articulated
yet. And surely the presence of obstacles in a society such as Russia the principles of establishing
such a council are in themselves problematic.
There is a set of problems that seem significant in the analysis of the possibility of
realization of the “Public Council for M orality on TV” project.
The first significant problem is the absence of value consensus in Russian society.
In a multi-normative society in which different values and normative models caused by
poly-confessional and poly-ethnic social structure coexist and which would be affected by other
factors of diversity, the activity of any council for morality would be successful only if there would
be a critical level of agreement of what is “good” and what is “bad.”
M oreover reaching a “zone of agreement,” a minimum of “axiological unity” seems to be
increasingly remote at the present time. According to my observations during the last decades
centrifugal forces damaging to values and normative space of social life are more evident than
centripetal forces gathering and uniting society, leading it to agreement on the question of values.
Here we do not mean vertically forced indoctrination, the attempts of normative uniting of values
made “from above.” These attempts – if we look at possible consequences – are seemingly the
catalysts of “centrifugal forces”.
The modern world offers great variety and variability of ethical norms and ideas about
what is moral and what is not linked to the most important world view categories of a person – the
attitude toward death, the idea of fam ily, the understanding of social justice, etc. Conditions of
relativist occasional ethics in pluralism destroyed the fragile social unity in Soviet Union quite
rapidly (if we assume that such unity existed in reality).
In conditions of growing variability the elaboration of joint and united idea of good and evil
becomes more and more problematic. For instance, a TV program where polygamy is represented
in a positive way could be acceptable for M uslims but would provoke protests by Orthodox
believers. The publication supporting the family status of homosexual couples becomes the reason
for indignation for followers of traditional religions but fits well enough within the frame of liberal
world views of modern youth. Public discussion about euthanasia has already divided several
European countries. The list of examples could be continued. It is hard to imagine them as subjects
of discussion at the meeting of the Public Council for Morality on TV and it is even more difficult
to think about possibility to arrive at one, united, judgment of its members. It is a more realistic
possibility in mono-confessional, mono-ethnic and theocratic countries.
That is why it is not surprising that two “test” sessions of the Council took place in
atmosphere of discussions in which the opinions of participants have been divided. This is quite
natural in above described context.
“W hat criteria will the members of the Public Council use in order to define what is moral
and what is not?” was a question raised by N. Gevorkyan, a journalist of “Gazeta.” W hether
Saveliy Yamshikov uses the same criteria as Vitaliy Tretiakov, and whether M ikhail Leontiev uses
the same as Pavel Lungin does? I’d like to understand – whether the words and actions of boys and
maids from “Dom-2” project are more immoral than jokes which are offered to TV viewers for
many hours per month trying to change them into brainless cretins? Do they consider such a
“humor” immoral? Do they consider bloody and morbid nightmare and horror translated by NTV
channel more moral than the “Dom-2” project"? (Gevorkian, 2008).
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The problem of the fundamental possibility of consensus on values is very rarely
mentioned in Russian mass media. To our mind this is the main obstacle to analyzing this initiative.
It is the main but not the unique barrier.
The second significant problem for the Public Council for M orality on TV is the absence of a system of
moral monitoring in mass media and public sphere from value defined, axiologically homogeneous social
institutions and groups.
W e are convinced that the highest level for aggregate judgment in the moral sphere is not
the society of the entire country, but a morally united monolithic homogeneous community whose
members have a consensus about good and bad. The uniting factor of such community is exactly
common morals. That is why they could be named “crystallization centers” of the society if we use
ethical indication, they could be also named the “magnets” or “leading lights.” Religious
organizations and other institutions with an explicitly expressed moral “credo” should be put in
this group.
They should be the main participants of social dialogue in the moral sphere accumulating
and articulating value judgments rooted in fundamental normative models (such as of Torah, the
Bible, Qur’an, the Book of M ormon, the oath of Hippocrates, etc) used in different situation of
modern practice and activity. Total weight of these voices in polyphonic choir would be admittedly
louder than voices of particular followers of some exotic ethical system.
Political parties and trade unions, clubs and other organizations where the uniting factor
towards ethical issues is external (fight for power, assertion of professional interest, getting income,
love for football or sauna, etc.) are not and fundamentally cannot be morally homogeneous social
institutions. M aximally it is possible to discover their conventional professional ethics. The idea of
good and evil apart from official activity is removed from the discussion to the private autonomous
sphere of members’ life.
The problem is that there is no system of “moral monitoring” of events and phenomena
of social life in media and public sphere made by acting and value defined communities. The light
of “moral leading lights” is not seen, they are poorly visible, poorly evident on the horizon of
public consciousness. In this context moral navigation of citizens is hardly realizable. Being
confused in conditions of value diversity, quite often Russians are not able to make sensible choices;
they are liable to normative pressure of different forces.
Even the voice of the most powerful of sources and opportunities and theoretically the
most united community in modern Russia – the Russian Orthodox Church – is not heard regularly
and systematically. The Church gives estimations in an àd hoc manner – when some scandalous and
extremely immoral thing happens. A s it was, for instance, with the “The Last Temptation of
Christ” film release, with the concert of pop-singer M adonna crucifying herself on a cross, etc.
In ordinary life there is no regular production and distribution of morally evaluated
judgments of TV production and wider enunciation of diverse socially significant problems and
situations made by the Russian Orthodox Church. M oreover, as a press officer of the Russian
Orthodox Church, priest Vladimir Vigilyanskiy, said that the M oscow Patriarchate did not plan to
establish the structures for regular moral evaluation of cinema and TV production like ones created
by the Roman Catholic Church. (Orthodox Council, 2008). M eanwhile at the Catholic Bishops
Conference in the USA and in some Catholic countries there are special institutions constantly
monitoring cultural life (primarily monitoring the film and television industry) and publishing
lists of the main events and news of this or that sphere with reviews every week. From time to time
M uslim leaders also publish the texts of normative and value contents – fatwa – actualizing dogma
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in the social sphere. The aim of such an activity on the field of TV consumption is to support
believers is making decision of what is worth seeing and what is not. These cases might also be
found in other religions.
It is important that even within the same institution evaluation should come from moral
authority of society but not from impersonal subjects representing institution in general otherwise
the risk of harsh judgments of people’s behavior and conscience would take places. M oral
authorities should give guidelines but not rule the people.
The third significant problem for the Public Council for M orality on TV activity is the absence of a wellarticulated dialogue of value systems.
If the moral monitoring of current events and facts does have a place, if “leading light”
works properly it would be possible to speak about an articulated dialogue of value systems within
the framework of constructing a normative model. In particular communication about moral norms
and their implementation for codifying facts and events in society is a fundamental and necessary
condition for formation of a balanced broadcasting policy.
Naturally this communication of value systems in the public sphere might be problematic,
difficult and even conflictual but it would contribute to agenda setting and to elaboration of
mediating mechanisms in the sphere of moral values. M oral dialogue in society is seen more
naturally as polyphony of voices of mutually respecting axiological homogeneous social
institutions than as a dissonant choir of voices of members from the Public Council who may be
respected in society but are personalities singing in different keys.
Trying to explain the difficulties with establishing the Public Council idea publicist
Vladimir M ozhegov stresses that idea that “moral councils” would be reasonable as “attempt to
find the common denominator between fighting social camps.” But, as he opines, “conservative
consciousness a priori supposes that it knows the absolute truth. This causes an unconcealed party
spirit, corporative feeling and containment of all actions”. Vladimir M ozhegov reminds us of the
phrase which M etropolitan Pitirim (Nechaev) of Volokolamsk liked to repeat: “M orality which
needs to be defended is not worthy of being defended.” (M ozhegov, 2008).
Sooner or later the problem of subjectivity appears. Citizens are necessary for civil control of
TV programs. Inert consumers satisfied with poor media contents of low quality are not enough.
Probably it would be possible to find 25 citizens for the membership in the Council for M orality.
But they hardly could influence the TV production and contents without wider social support,
without a solid basis of civil society.
Vitalyi Tretiakov, a Russian journalist, quite often discusses civil society topics in the
Russian public sphere. In December 2008 he expressed the belief that at present there were just two
powers that could be the base and support for promotion of the Public Council idea in Russia –
they were Vladimir Putin and Dmitry M edvedev. “If these two persons give a signal that this law
project should be approved by the State Duma and the president is ready to sign it, that will be the
way,” said Tretiakov (Tretiakov, 2008). It is gratifying that he discovered two persons seriously
influencing the formation of civil society in Russia. But what about the rest of the population? This
question still remains rhetorical.
Besides the “immaturity” of Russian society which is diagnosed by many experts, in this
article I would like to pay attention to the points which are not theoretically articulated up to this
moment during the public debates regarding the future of Public Council for M orality on TV due
to diverse reasons. M eanwhile I am convinced it will face these above mentioned obstacles. The
case of the Public Council shows that the position of a unique “moral tuning fork” in a poly-
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normative society is vulnerable and hard to implement.
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